St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 16

Number 2

Article 11

1-1-1985

A Non-Resident Defendant is Subject to a Multistate Libel Suit in
Any Jurisdiction Where Minimum Contacts are Established
between the Defendant and the Forum State.
Jeffrey C. Manske

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey C. Manske, A Non-Resident Defendant is Subject to a Multistate Libel Suit in Any Jurisdiction
Where Minimum Contacts are Established between the Defendant and the Forum State., 16 ST. MARY'S
L.J. (1985).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Manske: A Non-Resident Defendant is Subject to a Multistate Libel Suit in

PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT
DEFENDANT-MINIMUM CONTACTS RULE IN LIBEL
SUITS-A Non-Resident Defendant is Subject to a
Multistate Libel Suit in Any Jurisdiction Where
"Minimum Contacts" are Established Between the
aDefendant
and the Forum State

-

U.S.

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
4 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984).

Kathy Keeton, a citizen of New York, filed a libel claim against Hustler
Magazine, Inc. ("Hustler"), in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.' Keeton's only contact with the forum was the
circulation in New Hampshire of three magazines with which she was associated.' Hustler's association with New Hampshire was limited to the
monthly sale of ten to fifteen thousand copies of HustlerMagazine.3 Subject matter jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, but the district court held that due process prohibited the application of New
Hampshire's long arm statute 4 to obtain personal jurisdiction over Hus1. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. -__,
104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L. Ed.
2d 790, 796 (194) (New Hampshire suit was Keeton's second attempt to establish libel
claim). Prior to this claim, Keeton brought suit against Hustler in Ohio. See id at - n. 1,
104 S. Ct. at 1477 n.l, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 796 n.l. The Ohio court dismissed her claim because it
did not comply with the Ohio statute of limitations. See id at - n. 1, 104 S. Ct. at 1477 n. 1,
79 L. Ed. 2d at 796 n.l; see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.
1982) (New Hampshire statute of limitation was only one which would permit Keeton to file
libel suit without it being barred), rey'd and remanded, - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed.
2d 790 (1984).
2. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S.
_, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L. Ed.
2d 790, 796 (1984) (Keeton is not New Hampshire resident); see also Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1982) (Keeton is an editor of V'va and Omni
magazines and a staff member of Penthouse,which are circulated in New Hampshire), rev'd
andremanded, - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984).
3. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. _ _ 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L. Ed.
2d 790, 796 (1984) (Hustler's corporate headquarters located in Ohio); see also Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir. 1982) (New Hampshire accounts for only
one percent of Hustler's nationwide circulation), rev'dand remanded, - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct.
1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984).
4. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 300:14 (1978). The applicable part of the statute states:
[I]f such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in New Hampshire, such
act shall be deemed to be doing business in New Hampshire by such foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such foreign corporation of
the secretary of the state of New Hampshire and his successors to be its true lawful
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tier.5 The United States First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that since Keeton did not reside or suffer a substantial portion of her damages in New Hampshire, it would be unfair to require Hustler to defend
itself there.6 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
examine the lower courts' dismissal of Keeton's suit for want of personal
jurisdiction.' Held-Reversedand remanded A non-resident defendant is
subject to a multistate libel suit in any jurisdiction where "minimum contacts" are established between the defendant and the forum state.

attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings
against such foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such ... tort.
Id. See generally Kubiak, Jurisdiction-LongArm Statute-Slanderous Statement Made
Outside Forum State by Nonresident Causing Consequences Within Forum State as Basisfor
Jurisdiction Under Michigan Long-Arm Statute, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 263, 263 (1979) (survey
of cases where long-arm statutes have been extended over non-resident defendants in defamation cases).
5. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 683 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1982) (court concluded "that the New Hampshire tail is too small to wag [at] so large [of] an out-of-state
dog"), rev'd and remanded,- U.S. - 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984). There is a
distinction between personal and subject matter jurisdiction. See Cooper v. Reynolds, 77
U.S. 308, 316-17 (1870). According to Cooper, subject matter jurisdiction relates "to the
nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought." See id at 316. Personal jurisdiction,
however, is jurisdiction over the person and can be obtained by "service of process or voluntary appearance of the party in the progress of the cause." See id at 316-17.
6. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L. Ed.
2d 790, 796 (1984) (First Circuit indicates plaintiff's contacts important in jurisdictional inquiry). Compare Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 34 (Ist Cir. 1982) (First
Circuit suggests result might be different if Keeton's contacts more substantial with New
Hampshire), rev'd and remanded, . U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984) with
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, - U.S. - - n.5, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 n.5,
80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 409 n.5 (1984) (plaintif's'contacts with forum state not determining factor
affecting jurisdiction).
-,
104 S.Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L. Ed.
7. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S.
2d 790, 796 (1984) (inferred that certiorari also granted to determine if first amend. protection applies to mass media in jurisdictional analysis); cf New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 268-84 (1964) (first amend, rights apply to media through substantive law in
numerous circumstances). See generally Comment, Libel Litigation In Texas. The Plaintifl's
Perspective, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 978, 978-1011 (1982) (discussion of libel cases since New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and how they affect plaintiff's libel claims).
8. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L. Ed.
2d 790, 796 (1984) (Supreme Court, by inference, refused to extend first amend, protection to
mass media in jurisdictional analysis); see also Calder v. Jones, - U.S. _ _ 104 S.Ct.
1482, 1486, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 811 (1984) (citing Keeton with approval). In Calder, a companion case to Keeton, Shirley Jones, a California resident, brought a libel claim against the
National Enquirer, a Florida corporation. See id at - 104 S.Ct. at 1484, 79 L. Ed. 2d at
809. Calder, president of the National Enquirer, argued that California could not entertain
jurisdiction because to do so would cause a "chilling effect" on national publications. See id
at - 104 S. Ct. at 1485, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 810. The Supreme Court, however, refused to
extend first amendment protection to the media in the jurisdictional inquiry. See id at -
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Historically, a state could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant unless the defendant was actually present within
the state.9 The Supreme Court established the concept of territorial sovereignty as the basis for jurisdiction in Pennoyer v. Neff. 0 The main principle of territorial sovereignty was that a state had jurisdiction over all
persons or things located within its borders, but not over persons or things
outside its borders." A state's jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant,
however, was significantly expanded sixty-eight years after Pennoyerin InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington. 2
InternationalShoe established the contemporary due process standard
for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. 3 The
104 S.Ct. at 1487-88, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 813. But see Kotler, Suing the NationalMedia, 3 CAL.
LAW. 35, 36-37 (1983) (failure to extend first amend, to jurisdictional analysis will have
"chilling effect" on mass media).
9. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident invalid). In Pennoyer, the Court held that if a court wrongfully asserted jurisdiction
over a nonresident, the court's judgment was void. See id at 732-33.
10. See id.at 723-24. Pennoyer is considered to be the forefather of modern day personal jurisdiction law. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause andthe In
Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts-FromPennoyer to Denckla. A Review, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 569, 570 (1958). For a survey of cases involving jurisdiction over nonresidents from
Pennoyerto InternationalShoe, see id.
at 569-624; see also Lewis, The "ForumState Interest"
Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional
Carts, 33 MERCER L. REV. 769, 771-72 (1982) (Pennoyer being reconsidered by courts because of its fairness to non-resident defendants).
11. See Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules.- A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600, 602 (1977) (non-resident defendant must be present in
forum for jurisdiction to attach). The PennoyerCourt,however, would allow the forum state
to entertain jurisdiction if the nonresident's property was present in the state. See id.
at 602;
see also Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-LongLive Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MTN.L. REV. 285,
291 (1958) (Pennoyers rules slowly being eliminated from jurisdictional inquiries). The
modern day distinction between types of jurisdiction was set out in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaffer, the Court stated:
If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's person, the action
and judgment are denominated "in personam" and can impose a personal obligation on
the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction is based on the court's power over
property within its territory, the action is called "in rem" or "quasi in rem." The effect
of a judgment in such a case is limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and
does not impose a personal liability on the property owner, since he is not before the
court.
Id at 199.
12. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 312-16 (1945). The State
of Washington brought suit against a Delaware corportion, principally located in Missouri,
to recover contributions to the state's unemployment fund. See id at 312-13. The shoe
company contended that Washington did not possess jurisdiction to entertain this suit. See
id at 315. Specifically, the shoe company argued that its actions within Washington did not
constitute "presence" within the standard of Pennoyer. See id.at 315.
13. See id.
at 316 (Court sets forth and explains "minimum contact" rule). See gener.
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due process test established in InternationalShoe to determine whether a
state can entertain jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff establish that a nonresident defendant has "certain minimum contacts" with the forum state.' 4
In addition, the plaintiff must prove "that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "'5 To
properly ascertain "minimum contacts," a court must concentrate on "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." 16 In adally Scott, Jurisdiction Over the Press.- A Survey and Analysis, 32 FED. CoM. L.J. 19, 20
(1980) (International Shoe is standard to be followed in determining personal jurisdiction
over non-resident media defendants in libel suits).
14. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (modifies and
redefines Pennoyer "presence" standard). One is "present" in a state under the minimum
contact rule if activities of a "continuous and systematic" nature are conducted in the state.
See id at 317; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
(1980) (discusses purpose and functions of minimum contacts rule). The minimum contacts
rule reduces the possibility of a non-resident defendant having to defend himself in a hostile
forum. See id at 292. In addition, it prevents states from overreaching their jurisdictional
boundaries and, thus, offending sister states. See id at 292. Many articles have addressed
the "minimum contacts" rule. See, e.g., Note, The Ffth Circuit Considers World- Wide Volkswagen and In Personam Jurisdiction. Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 32 ALA. L. REV. 571, 571
(1981) (Fifth Circuit adopts reasoning and holding of World- Wide Volkswagen); Note,
World- Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson.- Minimum Contacts in a Modern World, 8
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 783, 783-816 (1981) (examines how post-International Shoe cases have
interpreted minimum contacts rule); Note, Civil Procedure-Minimum Contacts-Eighth Circuit Survey. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 553,
553 (1982) (examines Eighth Circuit approach to minimum contact rule). See generally
Comment, Constitutional Law-In Personam Jurisdiction.- Federalism and Fairness as Functions of Minimum Contacts-A Conceptual Failure, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 796, 801 n.37 (1980)
(list of seven cases from 1961 to 1976 interpreting and applying minimum contacts rule).
15. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). International Shoe discussed the necessary requirements to satisfy due process. See id at 319. The Court stated:
[W]hether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment "in personam" against an individual or corporate
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
Id at 319.
16. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (new interrelationship favors plaintiffs). Shaffers interpretation of the minimum contacts rule makes it easier for a court to
entertain in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. See id at 204. Shaffer is a
significant decision because it applied the minimum contacts rule to an in rem action. See
id at 212. Previously, the minimum contact rule had only been applied to actions in personam. See id at 205-06. See generally Glen, An Analysis of "'MerePresence" and Other
Traditional Bases ofJurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 607, 607-16 (1979) (critical because
Shaffer emphasizes "contacts" and not "fairness"); Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v.Heirner." Seminal or Minimal, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 519, 519-24 (1979) (questions importance
of Shaffer),- Younger, Quasi In Rem Defaults After Shaffer v. Heitner." Some Unanswered
Questions, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 675, 675-80 (1979) (Shaffer has made quasi in rem jurisdic-
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dition, the "minimum contacts" rule requires that the defendant's conduct
be such that it is both "reasonable" and "fair" to require a nonresident to
defend himself in the forum state.' 7 In determining reasonableness, a
court must ascertain whether the out-of-state defendant "purposefully
availed"'" himself of the benefits and privileges of the state.' 9 Additionally, a state should also possess a legitimate interest in the resolution of a
plaintiff's claim to justify entertaining jurisdiction.2"
In libel suits, the "single publication rule"'" provides states with a suffi-

tion complicated and confusing); Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe.- Shaffer v. Heitner and
the Demise of Presence-OrientedJurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 565-606 (1979)
(characterizes Shaffer as landmark decision).
17. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298-99 (1980)
(unreasonable for New York automobile wholesaler to be subject to Oklahoma jurisdiction
when dealer has no contacts with state); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978)
(not equitable to subject father to California jurisdiction when only contact with state is
sending daughter, at her request, from New York to live with mother in California); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977) (not reasonable to require non-resident defendants to
defend lawsuit in Delaware merely because of statutory presence of their property in that
state).
18. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (personal jurisdiction will not
attach over non-resident defendant unless "purposefully avails" test is satisfied). The
Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident can be entertained if
"there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." See id.at 253; see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978) (citing
Hanson's "purposefully avails" test with approval). But see Phillips v. Anchor Hocking
Glass Corp., 413 P.2d 732, 735 (Ariz. 1966) (criticizes Hanson's "purposefully avails" test
because does not consider fairness to non-resident defendant). See generallyThode, In Personata Jurisdiction, Article 2031B, The Texas "Long Arm" JurisdictionStatute, and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279, 307 (1964)
(applied Hanson to Texas cases); Comment, Hanson v. Denckla, 72 HARV.L. REV. 695, 695708 (1959) (discussion of impact of Hanson on personal jurisdiction over nonresident).
19. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978) (New York resident's actions in allowing daughter to live in California does not constitute "purposefully availing"
oneself of benefits and privileges to allow California to assert jurisdiction).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 37 (1971) (states possess
legitimate interest in adjudicating claims when defendant causes harmful acts to occur
within state). In addition, the text states:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects
in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from
these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the
state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
Id § 37; see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 n.l (1978) (§ 37 has been
adopted by California as law).

21. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 577A(4) (1977). The text of the single

publication rule is as follows:
As to any single publication, (a) only one action for damages can be maintained; (b) all
damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action; and (c) a judg-
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cient interest for asserting jurisdiction over non-resident media defendants.22 While all states have an interest in righting wrongs which occur
within their own territory,2 3 the single publication rule allows a plaintiff to
recover in the forum state for injuries suffered elsewhere. 24 This rule eliminates additional litigation between the parties, in that it prevents a plaintiff from bringing another libel suit once his claim has been either satisfied
or denied.2 5
Throughout the evolution of libel suits involving non-resident mass media defendants, the most perplexing problem has been whether or not to
The
apply first amendment rights to the jurisdictional determination.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted first amendment protection to a national publication in the jurisdictional inquiry in
ment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages bars any
other action for damages between the same parties in all jurisdictions.
Id § 577A(4). Compare Stephenson v. Triangle Publications, 104 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.
Tex. 1952) (citing single publication rule with approval) with Note, The Single Publication
Rule in Libel.- A Fiction Misapplied,62 HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1041-50 (1949) (critical discussion of single publication rule).
22. See, e.g., Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1977) (New York applies
single publication rule); Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth. v. Cox Enter., Inc., 250 S.E.2d
550, 551-52 (Ga. 1978) (Georgia adopts single publication rule); Church of Scientology v.
Minnesota, 264 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 1978) (Minnesota follows single publication rule).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 36 comment c
(1971). This section states:
A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit
torts within its territory. This is because torts involve wrongful conduct which a state
seeks to deter, and against which it attempts to afford protection, by providing that a
tortfeasor shall be liable for damages which are the proximate result of his tort.
Id. § 36 comment c; see also Menchaca v. Chrysler Life Ins. Co., 604 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ) (Texas court entertained jurisdiction over foreign
corporation which committed tortious action in Texas).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4)(b) (1977); see also Fouts v.
Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 535, 536-37 (D. Conn. 1953) (single publication rule
allows plaintiff only one action for damages).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4)(c) (1977); see also Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 420 N.E.2d 377, 382 n.4, 438 N.Y.S.2d 496, 501 n.4 (1981) (purpose of
single publication rule to prevent vexatious litigation).
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amend, provides, in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id
27. Compare Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1967) (first
amend. rights should be considered in jurisdictional analysis involving non-resident media
defendants) with Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978) (first
amend. should not apply to jurisdictional inquiry in defamation actions); see also New York
Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) (first amend. protection for nonresident media defendants necessary in determination of jurisdiction). See generallyScott,
Jurisdiction Over the Press.- A Survey and Analysis, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 19, 19-53 (1980)
(presents overview of cases interpreting whether first amend. applies to jurisdictional analysis in defamation suits).
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New York Times Co. v. Connor.2 8 The Connor court held that the first
amendment demands that a plaintiff show a more significant number of
contacts by a media defendant with a forum state than would be necessary
if a non-media defendant were involved. 29 In contrast to Connor, other
courts have either modified or rejected the application of the first amendment to the jurisdictional determination.3 °
The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Church of
Scientology v. Adams,3 1 dismissed the first amendment protection standard
provided by Connor and suggested a version of the products liability jurisdictional approach 32 to defamation suits. 3 3 In determining jurisdiction

28. See 365 F.2d 567, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1966) (New York Times faced libel claim in
Alabama due to article published on racial conditions); see also Buckley v. New York
Times Co., 338 F.2d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 1964) (libel action against New York Times in Louisiana). The Fifth Circuit dismissed the action in Buckley for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at
474-75. The court reasoned that the Times' contacts were insufficient to establish jurisdiction. See id at 474-75.
29. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) (court suggests precedent has encouraged adoption of this rule). Many articles have addressed the
impact of Connor on media defendants. See, e.g., Comment, ConstitutionalLimitations to
Long Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 436, 437-39 (1967)
(Connor protects newspaper defendants in libel actions); Note, The Application of the First
Amendment to Long Arm Jurisdiction,21 Sw. L.J. 808, 812-13 (1967) (Connorprovides relief
for media defendants); Note, Jurisdiction-MinimumContacts-FirstAmendment RequiresA
GreaterShowing of Contact in a Libel Action to Satisfy Due Process Than Is Necessary in
Other Types ofActions, 20 VAND. L. REV. 921, 924 (1967) (plaintiffs in libel actions will have
difficulty persuading courts to entertain jurisdiction over non-resident media defendants).
30. See Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejected
Connors and suggested foreseeability of litigation test for jurisdictional analysis in defamation suits); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1967) (modified
Connorby holding first amend. rights should be one of many factors in jurisdictional analysis). Golino further held that the first amend. should be more relevant in a jurisdictional
inquiry in a libel suit involving a small magazine as compared to a national publication. See
id at 592 n.13. The court reasoned that the national publication relies on a broader reader
base than the regional publication and must, therefore, assume the risk of doing business in
a hostile forum. See id at 592; see also Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 147
Cal. Rptr. 59, 64 (Ct. App. 1978) (dismissed Connorand suggested foreseeability test similar
to Adams').
31. 584 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1978) (California church allegedly defamed in Missouri
newspaper). The church brought the libel action in a California court. See id at 895. The
federal district court dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. See id at 896. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order of dismissal. See id at 899.
32. See 3 R. HURSCH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16:1:16 (2d ed. 1975) (examines concepts for asserting jurisdiction over non-resident manufacturers and sellers). Most courts determine jurisdiction over a nonresident in products liability
actions on a factual basis. See id § 16:3. Numerous cases have held that a court may entertain jurisdiction over a nonresident in a products liability action where the injury to the
plaintiff is the only contact the defendant has with the forum state. See id § 16:4. Other
courts have required a non-resident defendant to be "doing business" with the foreign state
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over a non-resident defendant in products liability cases, a court is to examine whether the defendant could foresee the defective product entering
the forum state. 34 In applying this test to libel suits, the Adams court concluded that jurisdiction over a non-resident mass media publication could
be asserted if the defendant could foresee harm by defamation in the fo-

rum state. 35 Numerous courts and commentators are concerned about the

possibility of a literal application of the products liability jurisdictional test

to multistate libel suits.3 6 They fear that if this test is applied, a non-resident mass media defendant will not be afforded any first amendment guar-

before they will entertain jurisdiction. See id § 16:11. "Doing business" has been interpreted by different courts to have numerous meanings. See id §§ 16:11-:13. See generally
Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manfacturers in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028, 1028-44 (1965) (analysis of factors necessary for court to assert
jurisdiction over non-resident manufacturer).
33. See Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1978) (jurisdictional test for defamation suits should ask whether injury by defamation was foreseeable in
forum state). The Ninth Circuit held that it was not foreseeable that the church could be
injured by a Missouri newspaper with a California circulation of 150. See id at 898-99.
34. See, e.g., Duple Motor Bodies v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir. 1969)
(foreseeable that automobile chassis would enter Hawaii when ordered from Hawaii); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 458 P.2d 57, 64-65, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120-21 (1969) (manufacturer should foresee possible injury to California residents because of amount of product
sold in state); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766
(Ill. 1961) (corporations which sell products to other states should foresee injuries to residents of those states).
35. See Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1978) (Adams
standard less strict than true products liability approach). If the true products liability approach were adopted, a publisher would be subject to a suit in any forum in which only one
issue of his publication was circulated. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567,
572 (5th Cir. 1966). As the Adams court stated:
The nature of the press is such that copies of most major newspapers will be located
throughout the world, and we do not think it consistent with fairness to subject publishers to personal jurisdiction solely because an insignificant number of copies of their
newspapers were circulated in the forum state.
Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1978).
36. See Sipple v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 59, 62-65 (Ct.
App. 1978) (distinguishes between newspaper publisher and manufacturer of goods in jurisdictional inquiry). In Sipple, the court recognized that a manufacturer sends his product
into a forum for the purpose of profit. See id at 64-65. The court also noted that publishers
of national magazines send their "product" into a forum to make money. See id. at 64-65.
The court, however, reasoned that it would be unfair to hold national, regional, and local
publications to a literal application of the products liability jurisdictional test. See id at 6465. The court could not justify holding a publisher of a small magazine or newspaper liable
for a tort in a jurisdiction in which the publishers did not intend to realize a profit. See id at
64-65. See generally Scott, JurisdictionOver the Press.- A Survey andAnalysis, 32 FED. COM.
L.J. 19, 19-53 (1980) (analysis of cases which discuss products liability jurisdictional test as
applied to defamation cases).
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antees in a jurisdictional analysis.37
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,3" the United States Supreme Court
determined that a non-resident mass media defendant is subject to a multistate libel suit in any jurisdiction where "minimum contacts" are established between the defendant and the forum state.3 9 The Court held that
Hustler's monthly circulation of ten to fifteen thousand magazines in New
Hampshire was sufficient to establish "certain minimum contacts. . . such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "4 The Court rationalized that since Hustler
sells a significant number of its national magazine in New Hampshire, it
must anticipate that the potential for a libel suit based on its publication
exists in that state. 4 ' In addition, the Court reasoned that New Hampshire's interests in Keeton's multistate libel action are both legitimate and
compelling.4 2 The Supreme Court recognized that New Hampshire has a
responsibility to the plaintiff and other states via the "single publication
rule.",4 3 Also, New Hamsphire is justified in exercising its libel laws in this

37. See Kotler, Suing the NationalMedia, 3 CAL. LAW. 35, 35 (1983) (media will experience chilling effect if first amend. not applied to jurisdictional analysis). Forum shopping by
allegedly libeled plaintiffs is the major concern of media attorneys. See id at 35; see also
Resources Inv. Corp. v. Hughes Tool Co., 561 F. Supp. 1236, 1238 (D. Col. 1983) (plaintiffs
choice of forum should be respected); Ginsey Indus., v. I.T.K. Plastics, 545 F. Supp. 78, 80
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (plaintiffs choice of forum should usually prevail); Clopay Corp. v. Newell
Cos., 527 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D. Del. 1981) (preference for plaintiff's choice of forum).
38. - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 1473, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984); see also Calder v. Jones, - U.S.
_ 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984) (companion case to Keeton).
39. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,

-

U.S. _,

-

104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L.

Ed. 2d 790, 796 (1984) (issue was also whether plaintiff can sue magazine where it
circulates).
40. See id at .__., 104 S. Ct. at 1481, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 801. The Keeton court relied on the
minimum contacts rule as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), to justify its decision. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,

-

U.S. __, _,

104 S.

Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790, 797-98 (1984).
41. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 1480, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 800 (Court suggested Hustler be
accountable for actions in New Hampshire because magazine would use its courts if it
brought suit against New Hampshire resident). The Supreme Court reasoned that Hustler
must be aware of the laws of New Hampshire as they apply to national publications. See id
at , 104 S. Ct. at 1480, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 800; accordCalder v. Jones, - U.S. _ __ 104 S.
Ct. 1482, 1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 812 (1984) (publishers who directed article at California
resident should expect to defend suit in that state if one arises).
42. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,

-

U.S. _

-

104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479, 79 L.

Ed. 2d 790, 798 (1984) (New Hampshire has responsibility to provide forum for persons
injured in their state); see also Leeper v. Leeper, 319 A.2d 626, 629 (N.H. 1974) (emphasizes
state's responsibility to right wrongs which occur within its jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 36 comment c (1971) (reasonable for state to entertain
jurisdiction over person who commits torts in that state).
43. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,

-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

U.S. - __

104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 79 L.

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 2, Art. 11

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:513

action to protect its citizens from false statements." The Court further
held that the residence and the contacts of the plaintiff with the forum state
are not determinative in ascertaining the appropriateness of granting jurisdiction.45 Furthermore, the Court did not find New Hampshire's lengthy
six year statute of limitation for libel suits a pertinent factor in determining
Hustler's contact with the state.46
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Brennan deemphasized the importance of fulfilling a state's best interests and stressed the importance of the
due process clause in ascertaining minimum contacts.47 Justice Brennan
suggested that a state's interests must be balanced against a non-resident
defendant's due process rights.48
The Keeton Court has virtually eliminated the extension of first amendment guarantees to jurisdictional inquiries involving non-resident mass
media defendants in libel suits. 49 The failure to extend first amendment
protection will possibly have a "chilling effect" upon the mass media, especially national publications.5" In fact, the Keeton Court recognized that
Ed. 2d 790, 799 (1984) (New Hampshire courts will prevent multiplicity of libel claims in
other states and best serve judicial economy by asserting jurisdiction).
44. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 1479, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 799 (New Hampshire has interest in
protecting residents from false statements); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974) ("no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
45. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. -, - 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-82, 79 L. Ed.
2d 790, 799-802 (1984) (Court examined importance of plaintiffs residence in determining
minimum contacts). The irrelevance of the plaintiff's residence to the jurisdictional analysis
is based on the rule that a plaintiff need not establish minimum contacts with the forum state
for jurisdiction to attach. See id. at _., 104 S. Ct. at 1480-81, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 800-01; see also
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, - U.S. -, - n.5, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 n.5,
80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 409 n.5 (1984) (residence of plaintiff not determining factor in decision to
grant jurisdiction); Calder v. Jones,

-

U.S.

-,

_,104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804,

811 (1984) (although plaintiff was resident of forum state, plaintiffs contacts not to be considered in determining minimum contacts); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437, 438 (1952) (allowed forum state to confer jurisdiction although neither party was resident of forum).
46. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790, 800 (1984) (any unfairness resulting from New Hampshire's statute of limitations should not be discussed in jurisdictional inquiry). The Supreme Court approved Keeton's search for a jurisdiction in which her claim would not be stale. See id at _, 104 S. Ct.
at 1480, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 800.
47. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 802 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. See id. at - 104 S. Ct. at 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 802 (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. See id at -_, 104 S. Ct. at 1478-82, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 797-802 (inference based on
holding and reasoning of Keeton Court); see also Calder v. Jones, - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct.
1482, 1487-88, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 813 (1984) (Court expressly refused to apply first amend.
rights to jurisdictional inquiry in libel suits).
50. See Kotler, Suing the National Media, 3 CAL. LAW. 35, 37 (1983) (failure to apply
first amend. to jurisdictional inquiry will have "chilling effect on the free flow of information
available to the public"); see also Scott, JurisdictionOver the Press.: A Survey andAnalysis,
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courts may confer jurisdiction in states where the national publication's
circulation is less than one percent." The Keeton decision, however, does
not affect the numerous first amendment protections in the substantive law
of defamation first provided by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.52 The
Sullivan Court held that the media is not liable for the defamation of a
public official unless it is published with "actual malice."53 In Curtis Pub-

32 FED. CoM. L.J. 19, 53 (1980) (fear of excessive libel claims against national publications
will produce chilling effect in mass media if first amend, excluded from jurisdictional analysis). But see Calder v. Jones, - U.S. _ _ 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1488, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 813
(1984) (substantive law protections inherent in actual trial of libel suits eliminates possible
chilling effect from not applying first amend, rights to jurisdictional determination); Church
of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978) (first amend. protection in jurisdictional analysis unnecessary because of substantive law at trial stage of libel suit).
. 51. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - - 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1489, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790, 800-01 (1984) (one percent of circulation sufficient to establish minimum contacts for jurisdictional purposes). Compare Young, Supreme Court Report, 70 A.B.A. J. 108,
108 (1984) ("Regular circulation of a magazine in a state is sufficient to support that state's
jurisdiction in a libel suit.") with Elkhart Eng'g Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861, 868
(5th Cir. 1965) (introduction of single defective product into forum state is sufficient to establish minimum contacts for jurisdictional inquiry in products liability case). A Wisconsin
corporation brought a suit against a German corporation, which does no business in the
United States, for damages to its custom plane. See id at 863. The defendant's only contact
with the forum, Alabama, was during a demonstration flight of the plane for its own purposes. See id at 863. Dornier contended that it was not "doing business" in Alabama such
that it would be within the reach of the minimum contacts rule. See id at 864. The Fifth
Circuit held that Alabama properly granted jurisdiction although the defendant's only contact with the forum state was the single act which caused the damage. See id at 865. The
court reasoned that jurisdiction properly attached because the defendant's "business" involved "dangerous activities." See id at 867. The court, however, stated that its holding
should not be limited to single transactions involving "dangerous activities." See id at 868;
see also Scott, JurisdictionOver the Press.- A Survey andAnalysis, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 19, 2526 (1980) (application of Elkhart Eng'g Corp. standard to jurisdictional analysis in libel
suits). But see Calder v. Jones, - U.S. _ _ 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 812
(1984) (rejected argument that media defendants would be subject to version of products
liability test). In Calder, the National Enquirer's employees likened themselves to a welder
who worked on a product in one state and was not held liable when the product exhibited a
defect in another state. See id at - 104 S.Ct. at 1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 812. The Supreme
Court dismissed the argument as a faulty analogy. See id at - ,104 S. Ct. at 1487, 79 L. Ed.
2d at 812.
52. See Kotler, Suing the NationalMedia, 3 CAL. LAW. 35, 36-37 (1983) (Keeton is limited to application of first amend. to jurisdictional analysis). The first amend. adequately
protects media defendants in libel suits through substantive protections. See id at 36; see
also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (applies first amend, to
substantive law). See generally Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 471, 474-89
(1975) (examines first amend. protections provided for media in libel suits).
53. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). A statement is
made with "actual malice" when it is published "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." See id at 279-80. The Court, however,
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lishing Co. v. Butts,54 the Supreme Court applied the actual malice standard to "public figures." 55 In addition, the first amendment protections
include the imposition of the actual malice standard to statements of public interest by the media,5 6 the requirement that a plaintiff's proof of defamation be of "convincing clarity,"5 7 and an independent review of the
record by the appellate court. 8
Although the Keeton decision may have an adverse impact on media
defendants in the jurisdictional determination, it confers numerous benefits upon allegedly libeled plaintiffs. 9 Most importantly, it permits an in-

did not define the term "public official." See id. at 282-83 n.23; see also St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (Court redefines "actual malice" standard). In St.
Amant, Justice White suggests that "actual malice" exists where there is "sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the defendant, in fact, entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication." See id. at 731. See generally Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.
REV. 471, 476 (1975) ("actual malice" standard suggested by St. Amant is subjective test).
54. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (football coach defamed by Saturday Evening Post).
55. See id at 163-64 (Warren, J., concurring). A public figure is one who is "intimately
involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape
events in areas of concern to society at large." See id.at 163-64. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Press and Speech-Non-Official Public Figure, 32 ALB. L. REV.
207, 207-12 (1967) (discussion of Butts' application of "actual malice" standard to public
figures).
56. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (Court expands first
amend. protection to include matters of public interest). In Rosenbloom, the Court addressed the issue of whether the actual malice standard applied to a private person in a
defamation action involving "an event of public or general interest." See id at 31-32. Justice Brennan believed "that the determinant whether the first amendment applies to state
libel actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general concern." See id. at 44. The Court, however, did not define what constituted an issue of public
interest. See id at 44-45; see also Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 471, 478
(1975) (failure of Court to define issues of public concern will permit publishers to define
term themselves). But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (Court
criticizes Rosenbloom decision). In Gertz, the Court expressed the belief that the Rosenbloom
decision was too broad and denied the states substantial rights. See id. at 345-46. The Gertz
Court held that the state courts should be free to set their own standards of defamation
liability where private citizens are concerned. See id. at 347.
57. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (Constitution
demands "convincing clarity" standard).
58. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (appellate courts permitted to
review conclusions of lower courts as to evidence and facts presented); see also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 n.26 (1964) (states what circumstances allow independent review of facts by appellate courts).
59. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477-82, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790, 796-802 (1984) (Court permits plaintiffs to choose forum regardless of personal
contacts with forum); see also Calder v. Jones, - U.S. 1 - 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486, 79 L. Ed.
2d 804, 811 (1984) (citing Keeton with approval).
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jured plaintiff to "shop" for a forum with substantive or procedural rules
advantageous to his cause of action.6" As did Kathy Keeton,6 a plaintiff
may take advantage of New Hampshire's six year statute of limitations, the
longest in the nation for libel suits.6 2 This would permit a plaintiff to completely ignore the relatively short statutes of limitation designed to protect
publishers from stale libel claims.6 3 Also, the Keeton decision reaffirmed
that a plaintiff need not have any contact with the forum state.' This
creates a situation such that a plaintiff could conceivably bring a libel suit
in a state in which harm is practically nonexistent.6 5
A non-resident media defendant, however, is not left without a shield in
the jurisdictional determination. 66 Initially, a plaintiff in a defamation suit
60. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - _, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790, 800 (1984) (equitable for allegedly libeled plaintiff to "shop" for forum hospitable to claim); cf.Kotler, Suing the National Media, 3 CAL. LAW. 35, 37 (1983) (media defendants will be forced to defend libel claims in hostile forums if plaintiff allowed to seek
friendly forum).
61. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. _ _ 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1477, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790, 797 (1984) (Keeton's libel suit barred by statute of limitations in every other
state at time claim filed in New Hampshire). For example, Ohio, the corporate headquarters
for Hustler Magazine, possessed a six month statute of limitations for libel actions. See id at
n.1, 104 S. Ct. at 1477 n.1, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 796 n.1.
62. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 1480, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 800 (statute of limitations is irrelevant in determining minimum contacts). The Court did not discuss the fairness of subjecting
media defendants to lengthy statutes of limitations. See id at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1480, 79 L.
Ed. 2d at 800. The Court did, however, recognize that the appropriate time to address this
question is during trial and not in the jurisdictional determination. See id at - 104 S. Ct.
at 1480, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 800; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) ("The
issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law.").
63. See Kotler, Suing the National Media, 3 CAL. LAW. 35, 37 (1983). The states which
have a lengthy statute of limitations for libel actions will be flooded with lawsuits by plaintiffs who have delayed their claims. See id. at 37. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4
(1977) (New Hampshire statute of limitations for libel actions is six years) with TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5524 (Vernon 1958) (Texas statute of limitations for libel actions is one
year).
64. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790, 800-01 (1984) (plaintiffs contacts with forum state are irrelevant in determining
minimum contacts between media defendant and forum state); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, - U.S. _ _ 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1871, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404, 409
(1984) (ifjurisdiction properly ascertained, plaintiffs failure to establish contacts with forum
state will not defeat jurisdiction).
104 S. Ct. 1473, 1479, 79 L.
65. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. ___
Ed. 2d 790, 799 (1984) (Court reasons that libel statement made in state in which defamed
person is unknown causes harm). The Court suggests that the residents of the state will have
a negative impression of the individual because of the libel. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 1479,
79 L. Ed. 2d at 799.
66. See Calder v. Jones, - U.S. , . 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1487-88, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 813
(1984) (unnecessary to apply first amend. to jurisdictional analysis because press adequately
protected by substantive laws). But see Kotler, Suing the NationalMedia, 3 CAL. LAw. 35,
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must satisfy the "minimum contacts" test before a court may assert jurisdiction.67 It is significant that the Supreme Court has determined that the
"minimum contacts" test is a sufficient standard for determining jurisdiction in virtually all types of actions. 61 Secondly, the first amendment guarantees in the substantive and procedural law provided by Sullivan and
subsequent decisions are adequate protection for media defendants.6 9
Therefore, the first amendment, as an additional protective device for the
media, is unnecessary in the jurisdictional analysis.7"
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Keeton maintains the
plaintiff as the dominant party in the jurisdictional inquiry in multistate
libel cases involving non-resident media defendants. By eliminating the
first amendment guarantees from jurisdictional inquiries in multistate libel
suits, the Supreme Court has determined that the "minimum contacts" test
is sufficient protection for the media defendant in the jurisdictional analysis. Through Keeton, the Court has guaranteed that the future holds an
increase in libel litigation in those few states with substantive and procedural laws favoring plaintiffs.
Jeffrey C. Manske

35-37 (1983) (without protection of first amend. in jurisdictional analysis, media vulnerable
to rash of lawsuits in hostile forums).
67. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. - . 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1481, 79 L.
Ed. 2d 790, 801 (1984) (minimum contacts rule standard for determining jurisdiction in libel
suits).
68. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)
(minimum contacts test must be satisfied before jurisdiction may attach in products liability
actions); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (minimum contacts rule due process standard which must be met to establish jurisdiction in family law suits); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (minimum contacts test standard for determining jurisdiction in corporate law actions). See generally Millet, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson." Minimum Contacts in a Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 783, 787-93 (1981)
(discusses development of minimum contacts rule).
69. See Scott, Jurisdiction Over the Press: A Survey and Anaysis, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 19,
23-24 (1980) (first amend. protections in substantive and procedural law satisfactorily protect media in defamation suits).
70. See Calder v. Jones, - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1488, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804, 813
(1984) (substantive law protections inherent in actual trial of libel suits eliminates possible
chilling effect from not applying first amend. rights to jurisdictional determination); see also
Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978) (first amend. protection
in jurisdictional analysis unnecessary because of substantive law at trial stage of libel suit).
But see Kotler, Suing the National Media, 3 CAL. LAW. 35, 37 (1983) (failure to apply first
amend. to jurisdictional inquiry will have "chilling effect on free flow of information available to public"); Scott, JurisdictionOver the Press.- A Survey andAnalysis, 32 FED. COM. L.J.
19, 53 (1980) (fear of excessive libel claims against national publications will produce chilling effect in mass media if first amend. excluded from jurisdictional analysis).
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